supported by public opinion polls, which indicate a three-to-one preference for re taining our current system of government over adopting the United States system. Hence, consideration of the method of selecting an Australian republican head of state should be based upon the premise that the office will essentially replicate that of the Governor-General.
Thus, the Australian head of state will essentially act as the personification of the Australian nation. Most of the head of state's time will be spent on ceremonial functions, such as opening Parliament and swearing in Ministers, or encouraging and rewarding worthwhile national endeavours by conferring honours, recognising past achievements and sacrifices, encouraging excellence in learning, the arts and sport, and generally defining the way Australians perceive themselves. The head of state's role as constitutional guardian will be exercised day-to-day through encourag ing governmental legality and regularity through the work of the Federal Executive Council (if it is retained) and suggestions to Ministers and, in exceptional and crisis situations, through exercise of the reserve powers. To fulfil these functions, the head of state must be a person of the utmost probity, who is seen as politically neu tral and able to represent all Australians, regardless of ethnic origin, religion or po litical beliefs. The head of state must be a person of dignity and achievement, whom Australians respect and of whom they feel proud; a focus for national unity, stability and continuity. It is, therefore, apparent that the choice of a suitable head of state is critical to the success of an Australian republic, for the appointee will be national head of state, no longer a mere surrogate, embodying Australians' self perception to a much greater degree than Govemors-General were able to.
The possible methods of choosing such a head of state are virtually limitless, but those most likely to be considered seriously fall on a spectrum ranging from appointment by the government through election by Parliament to popular election, and they will be considered here in that order.
Appointment by the Government
Direct appointment by the government is a theoretical possibility, but such an ap pointee would appear to be a mere 'lackey' of the government, and therefore bereft of the independence and political neutrality necessary to fulfil die functions of the office.
Moreover, such a method of appointment would not replicate the method of appointing Govemors-General, who are appointed by the monarch on the advice of the Prime Minister, whose advice is ultimately always followed. Since that method has produced Govemors-General who have generally performed well, it has occa sionally been suggested as an appropriate model for appointing the republican head of state, with a Council of State or Constitutional Council replacing the monarch in the appointment process, and thus formally making die appointment on the nomi nation of the Prime Minister. Such a Council might include the Chief Justice of the High Court and former heads of state or State Governors or (less likely since they are politicians) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate. Like the monarch, the Council could query the suggested appoint ment and perhaps endeavour to persuade die Prime Minister to wididraw the nominadon, but if the Prime Minister persisted, it would ultimately be obliged to give way (as George V did in appoindng Governor-General Sir Isaac Isaacs on the advice of Prime Minister Scullin in 1930). On die odier hand, the Council could, of course, be given a real power of veto, but that would represent a departure from the current mediod of appoindng vice-regal representadves.
Two consideradons appear to underlie this proposal. One is the argument that past experience suggests that Prime Ministers would exercise this power responsi bly. As the present Governor of Victoria recendy argued, ITlhere is great merit in the system which has evolved here wherein the Governor is chosen by the Premier alone. The Premier is aware that he or she alone has to bear die responsibility for, and the judgment of, both the community and history upon the quality of die person selected. (McGarvie, 1994:151 and 48) However, the more prosaic Council of State is unlikely endrely to replicate the role of the monarch, whose majesty and mysdque may somewhat restrain Prime Minis ters in nominadng proposed appointees.
Second, it is somedmes suggested that suitable appointees might be unwilling to face (and possibly lose) an elecdon by Parliament, let alone a popular elecdon. As Governor McGarvie (1994:151 and 47-8) put it, a parliamentary elecdon would tend to idendfy the nominee in die public eye widi die Premier's party. A person widi a good career and reputadon asked to agree to be nominated would not welcome running diat gaundet. If a person holding high office were refused parliamentary endorsement some would dien question die person's fitness to hold the high office.
However, a former Governor-General has discounted such concerns, arguing diat failure to secure parliamentary elecdon would represent no disgrace. On the con trary, the honour of nominadon to the nation's highest office would in itself be sig nificant recognition of achievement, analogous perhaps to an unsuccessful nomina don for a literary prize or an Academy Award (RAC, 1993a:68) .
Overall, appointment by the government has little support, either among com mentators or the general public, of whom no more than 4 per cent support it in public opinion polls. A January 1995 opinion poll found Prime Ministerial selec tion of the head of state opposed by 91 per cent, with only 6 per cent approving. As Sir Zelman Cowen (1994:20) observes, it is virtually certain not to be the method finally adopted.
Parliamentary Election
Many commentators have recommended that the head of state be elected by the Commonwealth Parliament, with quite a diversity of specific proposals being ad vanced. Election by a simple majority of both Houses, sitting either separately or jointly, is occasionally advocated, but most proposals would require election by a super-majority, usually a two-thirds majority of the members of both Houses sitting joindy.
Because, barring exceptional circumstances, neither major political party or coalition could achieve a two-thirds majority in a Senate elected by proportional representation (as it has been since 1949), achievement of such a majority would require bipartisan support, which would probably be accorded only to a highlyrespected, politically-neutral candidate; in other words, the type of person best suited to the office.
Apart from the appropriate majority, parliamentary election of the head of state raises several issues, including whether the two Houses should sit joindy or sepa rately, who should nominate candidates, and whether the States should participate in the election.
Joint sitting. A joint sitting of both Houses is widely favoured because it would avoid disagreement or even deadlock between the Houses, and the extraordinary parliamentary setting would serve to emphasise the importance of the occasion (RAC, 1993a:66) . It has been adopted in Trinidad and Tobago, and was also em- ployed in the Third and Fourth French Republics. However, there are countervail ing considerations.
Since the Senate theoretically represents the States or, more accurately, Austra lians voting as State electors, the Senate's participation in die election of the head of state would give the States a theoretical involvement hierein. A joint sitting of both Houses dilutes the States' (theoretical) voice in die Commonwealth Parliament, es pecially since the membership of the House of Representadves is constitutionally required to be 'as nearly as practicable' double tiiat of die Senate (s.24 of the Commonwealth Constitution). Thus die procedure specified by s.57 of the Consti tution represents the vindication and supremacy of democracy or representative government (embodied by the House of Representatives) over federalism (embodied by the Senate). So the election of a head of state by a joint sitting of both Houses might be seen as detracting from the federal principle underlying the constitution of the Commonwealth Parliament, and dius as needlessly antagonising die States and dieir defenders.
Second, the Commonwealth Parliament determines die mediod of electing Senators.
Hence, provided the legislation could secure passage in the Senate or was enacted pursuant to s.57, the current system of proportional representation producing an evenly balanced Senate could (in dieory) be abandoned in favour of mediods, such as those used before 1949, which produced grossly distorted Senate majorities, thereby facilitating the achievement of a two-diirds majority at a joint sit ting (Abbott, 1994) . This somewhat artificial spectre could also be raised against a requirement of majorities of 75 per cent, 90 per cent or even 100 per cent for that matter, so common sense and political reality should not be jettisoned entirely in considering possible future scenarios. (Moreover, die reality of die present system whereby the Prime Minister effectively appoints die Governor-General needs to be borne in mind.) However, the requirement of a two-diirds majority of the members of each House voting separately would reduce die risk of manipulation of the election of the head of state through changes in die mediod of electing Representa tives and Senators.
Moreover, if the possibility of such abuse were considered a serious risk, consti tutional safeguards could be introduced to counteract it. The Constitution could, for example, provide for a two-thirds majority if die Senate is elected by propor tional representation but specify a greater majority if it is not. Alternatively, propor tional representation of Senators could be constitutionally entrenched.
Nomination. Some commentators (for example, Turnbull, 1993:270) emment and opposition prior to nomination (RAC, 1993a:68-9) . This would tend to make the parliamentary election itself rather a formality. So, to offer Parliament a real choice and also ensure that a wide field of potential candidates is considered, some commentators argue that the nomination process should be taken out of the hands of parliamentarians who, it is feared, would be likely to nominate a politician or ex-politician. The requirement of bipartisan approval would not prevent this, it is said, since the politicians may enter into political 'deals' regarding occupancy of the office, or may agree to alternate the headship of state between the principal po litical parties (see Hirst, 1994:52) .
Various forms of Nominating Commission have been proposed. John Hirst (1994:127) , for example, has suggested that three persons be nominated by a Commission chaired by the Chief Justice of the High Court and also comprising the Speakers of all Australian Parliaments and 15 Companions of the Order of Austra lia chosen by lot, while Sir Rupert Hamer (1994) has proposed that one person be nominated by an 'Electoral College' of 20 Companions of the Order of Australia chosen by lot In both cases, the final choice would be made by a two-thirds major ity of a joint sitting of both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament.
If such a body be considered unduly elitist, the power to nominate candidates could be given (perhaps additionally) to a prescribed number of electors, as in Por tugal (whose president is popularly elected), or to a specified number of Common wealth and/or State and Territory parliamentarians, as in Israel, Trinidad and To bago, and Ireland (whose president is popularly elected) (RAC, 1993a:69) . If the States do not participate directly in the election of the head of state, it may be ap propriate to authorise State Parliaments to nominate candidates, perhaps in con junction with other sources of nomination. (An analogy may be drawn with the re quirement that State Attomeys-General be consulted on High Court appointments, which has led some States to suggest suitable candidates.)
State participation. If, like the Queen, the national head of state exercises powers and functions in respect of the States, the latter clearly ought to participate in his or her election (see Carney, 1994:193) . (If State autonomy is not to be impaired, any powers and functions in respect of the States should be exercisable only on the ad vice of State Ministers.) The case for State participation in the selection of a head of state who exercises no powers or functions in respect of them is weaker, but a case for State participation could nevertheless be made on the ground that the head of state should represent all sections of the nation and enjoy the widest possible support. John Hyde (1994) has even suggested that the head of state be chosen simply by a unanimous resolution of the Prime Minister and the State Premiers.
India and Germany provide for State (or L a n d ) participation in presidential elections on an equal basis with the national parliament, although the upper house of the German national parliament (the Bundesrat) does not participate. Regional governments similarly participate in presidential elections in (non-federal) Italy, as they also did in the Fifth French Republic before 1962, when popular election of the president was introduced. However, the Indian and German States (L änder) do not each have the same vote; rather, the vote of each representative depends upon the population of the relevant State or Land, which could prove politically controversial in Australia. Moreover, neither country really provides a precedent for State parliamentary participation in the election of an Australian head of state together with both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament: not Germany, be cause the upper house of its national parliament does not participate in presidential elections; nor India, because its national head of state appoints and removes State governors and exercises powers and functions in respect of the States.
It is also relevant that the German Länder do not have their own heads of state, whereas the Australian States are likely to retain separate Governors.
State participation in the electoral college which elects the national head of state would also render the process unwieldy, so that the electoral college may meet only on paper, and would certainly complicate the negotiation and compromise neces sary for bipartisan agreement. Consequently, Senate participation in the election of the head of state may be considered an adequate representation of State interests, with any direct State involvement being confined to nomination of candidates.
Public support for parliamentary election of the head of state rarely exceeds 20 per cent, and a January 1995 poll evinced opposition to it in the ratio of 69 per cent to 25 per cent.
But there is much to be said for it, for it would invest the head of state with the legitimacy derived from election by (most likely a supermajority o0 the people's representatives without conferring the direct mandate of the people derived from popular election. A popularly elected head of state would be the only nationally elected public office-holder, with a popular legitimacy more direct than the Prime Minister's and more general than that of any member of Par liament. Parliamentary election, on the other hand, would effectively place the head of state on the same level of popular legitimacy as the government, both ultimately deriving their authority from Parliament (the government, strictly speaking, from the House of Representatives). While it is true that it would be a rare government which could claim the support of two-thirds of the members of the House of Rep resentatives (let alone of both Houses), the head of state's authority would be lim ited to the exercise of the specific powers vested in the office, while the government would enjoy the mandate to govern derived from the continuing confidence of the House of Representatives.
The nomination of candidates and the procedure for voting thereon (no de bate?, secret ballot?) are obviously important, but it would be dangerous to specify them in a constitution as difficult to amend as Australia's, since it may prove im possible to alter aspects which prove unsatisfactory. Hence, it would seem prefer able to authorise Parliament to regulate diese matters either by ordinary legislation (see, for example, Winterton, 1994b: 18 (s.59 (4))) or, if considered appropriate, by legislation enacted by the same super-majority as elects the head of state. It would also be wise to introduce a constitutional provision to encourage successful comple tion of elections of the head of state by prohibiting the prorogation or adjournment of Parliament until a candidate had been elected (Winterton, 1994b: 18 (s.59 (3))).
Popular Election
Public opinion polls reveal very strong support (around 80 per cent) for popular election of the head of state of an Australian republic. In a February 1994 poll of fering a choice between ^parliamentary and popular election, the latter achieved a remarkable 91 per cent, and a January 1995 polMndicated support for popular election in the order of 88 per cent to 9 per cent.
The public understandably wishes to have a say in the selection of the head of state, but ironically a frequent motivation seems to be to avoid the selection of a politician or ex-politician (RAC, 1993a:70; Mackay Research, 1994:15-18 ). Yet, unless careful measures were intro duced to prevent it, popular election would be likely to produce a politician, or at least the nominee of a major political party, for only die political parties or the ex tremely wealthy could afford a national election campaign. As Gough Whidam (1994) recendy remarked, 'there is no surer way of absolutely guaranteeing that the President of Australia will always be a party politician than by making the presidency direcdy elective'.
A popularly elected head of state would symbolise die popular sovereignty un derlying the notion of a republic, and so may appear philosophically most com patible with republicanism. But practical considerations counsel against it First, a national election campaign (which the Irish experience suggests may effectively be come a vote on the popularity of the government -see Duffy, 1993:paras 3.21, 3.29, 3.35, 3.42, 3 .45 and p.179) may appear incompatible widi die political neutral ity necessary for a head of state in die 'Westminster' system. A candidate winning 51 per cent of die vote may find it difficult to be perceived as a unifying symbol of the entire nation. Sir Robert Menzies (1967:236) a non-political President periodically elected by popular vote, after an election cam paign, is a contradiction in terms'. Yet Ireland and Austria, both republics with a parliamentary executive, have demonstrated that popular election is not incompati ble with a politically neutral head of state.
However, worthy candidates from out side politics may well prove reluctant to subject themselves to popular election (RAC, 1993a:71) . The experience of Austria and Ireland suggests that, although popular election generally produces heads of state with a political background, that is not inevitably the case.
The involvement of political parties in elections for the head of state could be reduced by specifying qualifications for candidacy designed to open the process to non-politicians, combined perhaps with public funding of election campaigns. Thus, the Nominating Commissions noted above (p.140) could be employed for popular elections, or parliamentary and popular election could effectively be com bined, as Hugh has suggested, by limiting the popular election to a choice between three candidates (including at least one man and one woman) se lected by a two-thirds majority of a joint sitting of both Houses of the Common wealth Parliament.
Second, a popularly elected head of state may be tempted to interfere improp erly in governmental affairs through belief that popular election had conferred a 'mandate' equal, if not superior, to that of the government, whose Prime Minister was never personally elected in a national ballot. As Sir Zelman Cowen (1994:20) recently remarked, a popularly elected head of state 'would have a strong constitu tional base to confront effectively a prime minister with high and threatening per sonal aspirations'. He rightly considered this 'appalling' if we intend to retain our present system of government, for competition and division at the highest levels of the executive could prove very destabilising. The Leader of the Opposition has similarly warned that popular election of the head of state would alter for all time the nature of our system of government. It would entrench rival centres of political power. . . (Ain Australian president, hav ing a popular mandate, would feel infinitely more powerful in dealing with an incumbent Prime Minister than would any Governor-General, irrespec tive of the formal powers which might be given to that president. (Howard, 1994:130-1) France's change to popular presidential election in 1962 demonstrated that altera tion of the method of election alone, without the conferral of any additional consti tutional power, could substantially enhance the political power of the head of state relative to that of the government (Wright, 1983:25) . As two leading American commentators noted in 1954, Direct election gives the Head of State political authority even without ex press constitutional provision. It also tends to make him a partisan and though the purpose of direct election is to provide an embodiment of the federation, it destroys that air of neutrality that both the ceremonial func tions in any federation and the specific powers under a Parliamentary sys tem demand. (Friedrich & Guttman, 1954:74) .
Forty years later former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser (1994) similarly remarked that a direcdy-elected head of state would 'Ifroml that process alone, have authority and a capacity to compete in some things with the prime minister. That could usher in a period of instability'.
Consequently, popular election of an Australian head of state would raise the prospect of a substantial change in the balance of power between the head of state and the executive government, and thus in the system of government, leading to calls for close definition of the head of state's powers (RAC, 1993a:72-3; Turnbull, 1994:xii) . This in turn would rekindle the old controversy regarding the wisdom of codifying the reserve powers and thereby diminishing the flexibility of the head of state's possible response to a governmental crisis. The wording of specific provi sions would also prove controversial, and any attempt to resolve the contentious issue of how the head of state should respond to a denial of Supply by the Senate could completely derail the advent of a republic. Moreover, as Ireland realised, a head of state's possible intervention in governmental affairs need not be^confined to the exercise of constitutional power, but extends to public commentary.
These considerations suggest that popular election is not the ideal method for producing a politically neutral head of state enjoying broad community support, and exercising only sufficient independent power to enable him or her to act as the ul timate guardian of the Constitution by refusing to dissolve Parliament or dismissing a government which flagrantly contravenes the Constitution. However, if public support for popular election persists, the government may feel obliged to concede it notwithstanding its reservations, especially since recent public opinion polls sug- gest that it may affect the outcome of the referendum to establish a republic.
In that event, care should obviously be taken to address the two major concerns noted here: the electoral process should be opened to ensure participation beyond the political parties, and checks and balances should be introduced into the Constitu tion to preserve the present balance of authority between the Governor-General and the elected government. (For a suggested check, see Winterton, 1994c:53.) 
Conclusion
The constitutional amendments to achieve a republic must be passed by the Com monwealth Parliament (or passed twice by one House) and approved by the elec tors (a national majority and a majority in four States) in a referendum pursuant to s.128 of the Commonwealth Constitution. Hence, wide public consultation and discussion are appropriate before the proposals are even framed.
Some commentators have advocated a popularly elected Convention modelled on that which drafted the existing Constitution in 1897-98.
But present circum stances are not parallel with those of a century ago, when there was no constitu tionally ordained process for approving the proposed Constitution before its ulti mate enactment at Westminster. Moreover, it needs to be remembered that the 30 delegates elected in 1897 were virtually all current or former politicians, as one would expect, and as would be the case today. So, ironically, a wider cross-section of the public might be drawn into the process of constitutional change if the Con vention were not popularly elected.
While a Convention empowered by popular mandate may be appropriate if a thorough-going constitutional revision were contemplated (in which case the gov ernment should undertake to put the Convention's proposals to the electors, albeit not necessarily with its endorsement), such a grand and cosdy venture would seem inappropriate for the more modest task of framing republican proposals and pos sibly considering one or two other issues, such as aboriginal reconciliation and re form of federal financial relations.
Hence, as the present writer has argued elsewhere, the proposals for an Austra lian republic should be setded at a Convendon composed equally of parliamentari- ans and non-parliamentarians, the latter selected by all Australian legislatures on a bipartisan basis from a wide cross-section o f the community. Ideally, it should be convened in Perth or Hobart in March 1997, the centenary of the earlier Conven tion (Winterton, 1993) .
